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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant Juan Faulks entered into a plea agreement 
with the government which required him to cooperate in the 
investigation of individuals participating in the distribution 
of narcotics. In return for Faulks' assistance, the 
government agreed to file a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 5K1.1 requesting a downward departure from the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Faulks asserts that the district 
court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines because it 
granted the government's motion but, nevertheless, 
imposed a sentence within the applicable guideline range. 
Faulks also contends that the district court erred in 
declining to depart pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 based on 
his agreement not to oppose certain administrative 
forfeitures. Finally, Faulks submits that the district court 
erred in finding that the controlled substance he 
distributed was crack cocaine. 
 
We will remand for further sentencing proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
On two occasions in 1996, Faulks sold approximately 
eleven and one half ounces of cocaine base to a confidential 
informant. He was later arrested and charged with two 
counts of distributing a "substance containing cocaine base 
(crack)" in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1), two counts of 
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1956, one 
count of criminal forfeiture of real property pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 982, and four counts of criminal forfeiture of 
personal property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. S 853. App. at 8-9. 
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Faulks entered into a plea agreement which required him 
to plead guilty to the counts of cocaine distribution, money 
laundering and criminal forfeiture of real property. The 
government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of 
criminal forfeiture in return for Faulks' acquiescence in the 
administrative forfeiture of the personal property described 
in the indictment. It also committed itself to: 
 
       [m]ake a motion to allow the Court to depart from the 
       Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to Sentencing 
       Guidelines S 5K1.1, and to impose a sentence below 
       any mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 
       pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e), if the government, in 
       its sole discretion, determines that the defendant has 
       provided substantial assistance in the investigation or 
       prosecution of another person who has committed an 
       offense. 
 
App. at 36-37. 
 
When Faulks entered his guilty pleas, the court asked 
him at the outset to identify the charges to which he 
wished to plead guilty. He responded, "Two counts of 
distribution of crack cocaine, and forfeiture of my home, 
and to money laundering." App. at 45. Thereafter, the 
government made a proffer of evidence during which the 
prosecutor consistently and on six occasions referred to the 
substance distributed by Faulks as "crack cocaine." She 
reported during the proffer that the substance purchased 
by the informant on both occasions was tested by the DEA 
lab and determined to be "crack cocaine base." App. at 49- 
50. After the proffer, with one exception not here relevant, 
both Faulks and his counsel expressly confirmed that the 
government's version of the facts was substantially correct. 
 
The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") calculated 
the guideline range to be 87 to 108 months. This 
calculation assumed that the substance distributed was 
crack cocaine and that Faulks was entitled to escape the 
ten-year mandatory minimum provisions of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1)(A) under the safety valve provisions of U.S.S.G. 
S 5C1.2. Neither side objected to the calculation of the 
guideline range in the PSI. 
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Prior to the sentencing hearing, the government filed a 
"Motion for Downward Sentencing Departure Pursuant to 
Section 5K1.1." App. at 54. This motion characterizes the 
government's obligation under the plea agreement as one 
"to permit the Court to depart downward from the 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range." Id. The motion 
represented to the court that Faulks had provided the 
government with substantial assistance in the prosecution 
of other persons. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, Faulks' counsel argued for a 
downward departure based on his agreement not to contest 
the administrative forfeitures. He insisted that this was 
meaningful because "[s]ome of these items, for example, 
diamond rings and such, were purchased before this 
indictment occurred or before his drug activity occurred." 
App. at 58-59. Although the prosecutor acknowledged that 
Faulks had "consented to the forfeiture of these items 
administratively," she, inexplicably, agreed with the court 
when it advised Faulks that he could still contest the 
forfeitures if he chose to do so. App. at 59. The court did 
not explain the basis for this advice. It denied the requested 
downward departure on the ground that Faulks could still 
contest the forfeitures and therefore had given up nothing. 
 
Thereafter, the prosecutor called upon the court to grant 
the S 5K1.1 motion. Almost immediately thereafter she was 
asked to advise the court what sentence the government 
was recommending. She replied that the government was 
"recommending a minimal departure . . . in the upper range 
of the guideline," because Faulks had opportunities to 
provide "significant information" but chose not to do so. 
App. at 66, 71. Faulks' counsel objected and called upon 
the court "to depart from the 87 months, a downward 
departure, because then the 5K1.1 is meaningful." App. at 
70. The district court sentenced Faulks to 95 months of 
imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, it entered an order 
reflecting that it had granted the government'sS 5K1.1 
motion to depart. In its "Statement of Reasons" for its 
judgment, the court checked a box indicating that its 
"sentence departs from the guideline range upon motion of 
the government, as a result of defendant's substantial 
assistance," but then inserted by hand, "However, sentence 
is within guideline range." Addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
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II. 
 
As Faulks stresses, there is an inconsistency between 
what the district court said and what it did. The departures 
provided for in Part K of the Guidelines Manual are 
departures from "the range established by the applicable 
guideline." E.g. U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 Grounds for Departure 
(policy Statement). Thus, when U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 provides 
that "[u]pon motion of the government stating that the 
defendant has provided substantial assistance . . . the 
court may depart from the guidelines," it is authorizing the 
court to impose a sentence less than the range of sentences 
to which the Guidelines would otherwise limit the court's 
discretion. As the government acknowledged in its S 5K1.1 
motion, a motion under that section is, accordingly, 
intended "to permit the Court to depart downward from the 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range." App. at 54. This 
fact is also reflected in the printed judgment form utilized 
by the district court which characterizes a departure as a 
"sentence [that] departs from the guideline range." 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
 
It follows that when someone is promised the possibility 
of "a departure from the guidelines" under U.S.S.G. 
S 5K1.1, he or she may reasonably expect to be afforded the 
possibility of a sentence below the guideline range. It is 
thus important that United States Attorneys and district 
courts not use the term "departure" loosely. We are not 
confronted, however, with a claim that Faulks was misled 
by anyone to his detriment. He does not claim, for example, 
that the government failed to file a motion that he 
reasonably believed it would file as a result of the plea 
agreement.1 
 
What we are confronted with is an argument that a 
sentencing judge who has granted a S 5K1.1 motion is 
powerless to impose a sentence within the guideline range. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While it is true that the prosecutor, afterfiling the S 5K1.1 motion, 
recommended a sentence in the "upper range of the guideline" the Plea 
Agreement reserves to the government the right to "make whatever 
sentencing recommendation [it] deems appropriate." We are not called 
upon here, however, to determine whether the government's conduct was 
consistent with the Plea Agreement and we do not. 
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We conclude that this claim should be rejected where, as 
here, the record provides assurance that the sentencing 
judge recognized his authority to depart below the guideline 
range and there is no ambiguity about the intended 
sentence. 
 
The initial issue in our analysis is whether a district 
court, in the absence of a S 5K1.1 motion, may consider the 
defendant's assistance to the government in deciding where 
to sentence within the guideline range. We believe the 
answer must be "yes." Congress directed the Commission to 
"assure that the guidelines reflect the general 
appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would 
otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account a 
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense." 28 U.S.C. S 994(n). While this directive has been 
partially implemented by the S 5K1.1 departure authority, 
we are confident that neither Congress nor the Commission 
considered what was "generally appropriate" to be 
inappropriate when a sentencing judge is exercising 
discretion within the guideline range. To the contrary, we 
find consideration of substantial assistance for this purpose 
entirely consistent with the authority bestowed on 
sentencing judges. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
observed in United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d 
Cir. 1989): 
 
       [The authorizing statute and the Guidelines do] not 
       foreclose a sentencing court from considering a 
       defendant's cooperation as a mitigating factor in 
       deciding what sentence within the applicable range 
       designated by the Guidelines is appropriate, whether or 
       not the government agrees. . . . Under the Guidelines, 
       courts may weigh a wide array of factors, 18 U.S.C. 
       S 3661, including "the nature and circumstances of the 
       offense and the history and characteristics of the 
       defendant," 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(1), to arrive at a 
       sentence that "reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, 
       [ ] promote[s] respect for the law, and [ ] provide[s] just 
       punishment for the offense[.]" 18 U.S.C.S 3553(a)(2)(A). 
       We perceive no reason why a defendant's cooperation is 
       not a relevant factor in applying those standards. 
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Having resolved this threshold issue, we proceed to 
inquire whether the authority to consider substantial 
assistance in sentencing within the guidelines is affected in 
any way by the filing of a S 5K1.1 motion. The answer, of 
course, must be "no." Under the Guidelines, the sentencing 
court is free to deny the motion and sentence as it would 
have done in its absence. If the court believes it has given 
sufficient credit for the substantial assistance by moving 
down in the range, nothing we perceive in the Guidelines 
precludes it from avoiding undeserved credit by denying the 
government's motion. Thus, the district court in this case 
could have, quite properly, denied the motion for a 
departure and then gone on to acknowledge Faulks' 
substantial assistance by sentencing lower in the guideline 
range than it would otherwise have done. In the interest of 
avoiding possible misunderstanding in the future, we 
suggest that this is the preferable way to achieve the result 
that the district court clearly sought here. This conclusion 
does not, however, provide an answer to the argument that 
Faulks here advances based on the fact that the district 
court granted, rather than denied, the motion to depart. 
 
The final step is to determine whether a sentencing court 
may grant a S 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure and 
nevertheless impose a sentence within the otherwise 
applicable guideline range. We conclude that the district 
court's statement that it was granting a departure should 
be regarded as harmless error, and we hold that it, 
accordingly, does not mandate a sentence below the 
guideline range. The record makes clear both that the 
district court was aware of its discretion to depart below the 
guideline range based on Faulks' substantial assistance 
and that, in its discretion, that assistance did not warrant 
a sentence below that range. Since, as we have 
demonstrated, the district court was authorized to impose 
the sentence that it in fact imposed, its judgment should 
not be disturbed. Cf. United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 243 (1997). 
 
Situations may undoubtedly arise in which an 
inconsistency between granting a S 5K1.1 motion and a 
sentence within the guideline range will raise questions 
about whether the defendant was misled, whether the judge 
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understood that he had authority to depart, what sentence 
the judge actually intended, or whether the judge was 
otherwise confused. But this is not such a case. Faulks was 
told that he would receive a sentence for his cooperation 
below the guideline range only if the court found that 
appropriate and the court clearly did not. Contrary to 
Faulks' suggestion, there is nothing unclear or ambiguous 
about the court's 95 month sentence or about whether it 
was the sentence the court intended to impose. The court 
listened at great length to both sides' view of the value of 
Faulks' assistance and clearly decided that it would 
warrant an in-range reduction but not a sentence below the 
guideline range. Under these circumstances, we will not 
disturb the resulting sentence on this ground.2 
 
III. 
 
At sentencing, Faulks asked for a departure pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 based on his agreement not to contest 
certain administrative forfeitures. The Policy Statement of 
S 5K2.0 provides that: 
 
       Under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b), the sentencing court may 
       impose a sentence outside the range established by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. While the terminology chosen in S 5K1.1 suggests that a sentencing 
court is to calculate the applicable guideline range and then decide 
whether and how far to go below it, we note that at least two courts have 
adopted a different methodology. In United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589 
(3d Cir. 1995), and United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d. 321 (4th Cir. 1995), 
the district courts determined the total offense level, reduced the total 
offense level by a number of levels determined to be appropriate in light 
of the substantial assistance, and then calculated a guideline range 
using the reduced offense level. We had no occasion to pass judgment on 
this aspect of the district court's sentencing in King. We did suggest in 
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), however, that 
it is helpful in determining the extent of upward departures for 
sentencing courts to think in terms of the ranges that would be 
produced by using analogous offense level enhancements. Nevertheless, 
we do not read Kikumura to imply that it is improper in applying S 5K1.1 
for a district court to calculate the otherwise applicable guideline range 
and then make an appropriate reduction in the number of months to be 
served based on its appraisal of the value of the defendant's substantial 
assistance. 
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       applicable guideline, if the court finds "that there exists 
       an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or 
       to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 
       the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
       guidelines that should result in a sentence different 
       from that described." 
 
We have held that exposure to forfeiture is not a ground 
for departure under S 5K2.0 because "the Commission 
considered forfeiture when creating the guideline range for 
terms of imprisonment." United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 
1382, 1397 (3d Cir. 1992). Faulks does not argue, however, 
that his exposure to forfeiture should entitle him to a 
downward departure. His contention, rather, is that his 
voluntary surrender of meritorious defenses to forfeiture 
should entitle him to a departure. In his view, as we 
understand it, this voluntary surrender evidences 
extraordinary contrition and acceptance of responsibility. 
 
While Faulks acknowledges that he has received a three 
level decrease for acceptance of responsibility under 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1, he points out that in United States v. 
Lieberman, 971 F2.d 989 (3d Cir. 1992), we approved a 
downward departure for extraordinary acceptance of 
responsibility even though a two level decrease had been 
granted under U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. Faulks stresses that the 
downward departure in that case was justified in part by 
the fact that the defendant had agreed to pay more 
restitution than he believed he owed. 
 
Two other courts of appeals have held that the 
circumstances surrounding a payment of restitution may 
demonstrate an extraordinary degree of acceptance of 
responsibility, thus justifying a departure. In both 
instances, however, the court indicated that the mere 
payment of restitution or mandated forfeitures cannot, in 
and of itself, be the basis for departing from the Guidelines. 
See United States v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170 (7th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Crook, 9 F.3d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 
1993). We agree. As the Hendrickson court put it, "[p]rompt 
payment of [a] forfeited amount does not transform 
forfeiture into a ground for departure from the guidelines." 
Hendrickson, 22 F.3d at 176 n.6. 
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We do not read either Hendrickson or Crook to hold, 
however, that a voluntary surrender of meritorious defenses 
to forfeiture can never evidence an extraordinary 
acceptance of responsibility, and we decline to so hold. 
Where it can be established that meritorious defenses have 
indeed been foregone under circumstances that reflect an 
extraordinary sense of contrition and desire to make 
amends for the offense, we see no basis for distinguishing 
our holding in Lieberman regarding the voluntary payment 
of restitution not thought to be owed. 
 
In this case, Faulks' counsel was not given an 
opportunity to build a record in support of his application 
for a departure for extraordinary acceptance of 
responsibility because of the court's unexplained 
conclusion that the plea agreement did not foreclose Faulks 
from contesting the civil forfeiture. It may well be that the 
prosecutor's affirmance of the court's conclusion now 
estops the government from relying on Faulks' waiver of his 
alleged defenses. But that seems to us irrelevant to the 
issue of whether Faulks' willingness to enter the agreement 
in the first place evidences an extraordinary acceptance of 
responsibility on his part. 
 
We conclude that Faulks should be given a fair 
opportunity to support his application for a downward 
departure for extraordinary acceptance of responsibility. By 
so concluding, we express no view about whether he will be 
able to make the required showing. On the surface, at least, 
this does not appear to be an extraordinary situation. But 
that is a judgment for the district court to make based on 
the best record that Faulks can provide. 
 
Nor does our conclusion here condemn sentencing judges 
to try forfeiture actions in the course of their sentencing 
hearings. Given that the defendant must demonstrate a 
truly extraordinary situation in order to be entitled to a 
downward departure for extraordinary acceptance of 
responsibility, we would expect there to be very few cases in 
which an application for a departure on this ground cannot 
be disposed of on the basis of a proffer by the defendant. 
 
IV. 
 
The indictment charged Faulks with distributing crack. It 
is clear from the transcript of the plea-taking proceedings 
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that he understood this and that his plea was voluntary. A 
knowing and voluntary plea constitutes an admission of all 
material facts alleged in the indictment, even where those 
facts are not essential elements of the offense charged. See 
United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 823 n.7 (3d Cir. 
1995); United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1989). 
There was a further admission that the substance 
distributed was crack when Faulks agreed with the 
government's account of the factual basis for the plea. 
These admissions provide ample evidentiary support for the 
district court's finding on the subject. See United States v. 
Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
V. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and 
this case will be remanded for further proceedings on 
Faulks' application for a downward departure under 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0.3 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our review of the record reveals no basis for requiring that 
subsequent proceedings in this case be conducted by a different district 
judge. Faulks' request that we do so is, accordingly, denied. 
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